Why the EU’s Potential Delisting of Russian Oligarchs Matters Now
The European Union appears poised to remove prominent Russian oligarchs Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman from its sanctions list, according to multiple reports on 21 September 2026. This development comes as the EU faces internal debate over the effectiveness and credibility of its sanctions regime against Russia, particularly as the war in Ukraine continues. For Australian compliance teams, these moves signal a potential shift in the global sanctions landscape, raising questions about exposure, due diligence, and secondary risk management.
What Happened: The EU’s Sanctions Reversal
On 21 September 2026, reporting from UNITED24 Media and Межа. Новини України. indicated that EU diplomats have backed the removal of Usmanov and Fridman, with the final decision pending. A preliminary deal has reportedly been reached, though formal ratification is still required [44].
This development has not gone uncontested. Lithuanian finance minister Gintarė Skaistė publicly warned that removing Usmanov could make the EU appear weak, highlighting divisions within the bloc about the future direction of sanctions policy (Euronews). Additional coverage from Euronews.com and politico.eu confirms that EU countries are moving toward a broader Russia sanctions deal, with the delisting of high-profile individuals as a key point of contention.
Why the Delisting is Significant
The original inclusion of Usmanov and Fridman on the EU sanctions list was intended to target individuals with significant influence and assets linked to the Russian state and its war effort. Their removal, if confirmed, would mark the first high-profile reversal since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This could have a variety of implications:
- Sanctions Credibility: The move may be seen as a weakening of the EU’s resolve, especially as the war continues and other sanctions remain in place [77].
- Legal and Political Pressures: The EU faces ongoing legal challenges from sanctioned individuals, and internal political debates about the proportionality and effectiveness of asset freezes.
- Secondary Sanctions Risk: For non-EU entities, including Australian businesses and financial institutions, the changing status of Russian oligarchs creates new uncertainty about due diligence, ongoing risk exposure, and the potential for conflicting obligations under US, UK, and EU regimes.
Assessment: What Does This Signal?
Assessment: The EU’s willingness to delist Usmanov and Fridman likely signals a pragmatic shift, balancing sanctions fatigue, legal risk, and the desire to maintain unity across member states. This could foreshadow further reviews of the sanctions list, especially where there is insufficient evidence of ongoing support for the Russian state or where legal challenges are likely to succeed.
For Australian compliance teams, this suggests a need to monitor not just the letter of sanctions lists, but also the political and legal dynamics driving their evolution. The divergence between EU, US, and UK approaches may widen, increasing the complexity of cross-border compliance and the risk of inadvertent breaches or regulatory scrutiny.
Implications for Australian Compliance and Risk Teams
1. Enhanced Due Diligence and Ongoing Screening
The potential removal of Usmanov and Fridman from the EU list does not automatically remove them from other jurisdictions’ sanctions programs. Australian entities should:
- Continue to screen against all relevant sanctions lists (EU, UK, US, UN, AU).
- Monitor for real-time updates and ensure that automated screening systems reflect the most current data.
- Assess the origin of funds and beneficial ownership structures for exposure to Russian-linked entities, even if individuals are delisted in one jurisdiction.
2. Secondary Sanctions and Global Divergence
Secondary sanctions risk remains a concern, particularly from US authorities. If an individual is delisted by the EU but remains sanctioned by the US or UK, engaging in business with them could still trigger enforcement actions or reputational risk. Compliance teams should:
- Map out cross-jurisdictional exposure and develop protocols for resolving conflicts between regimes.
- Consult legal counsel when onboarding or continuing relationships with high-profile Russian-linked clients or counterparties.
3. Reputational and Regulatory Risk
The debate within the EU, as highlighted by the Lithuanian finance minister’s remarks, points to the reputational dimension of sanctions compliance. Australian firms should consider:
- How their own risk appetite aligns with global expectations, not just domestic law.
- Whether continued relationships with previously sanctioned individuals could attract regulatory or public scrutiny, even if technically permissible.
What to Watch Next
Australian compliance professionals should closely track the final decision on the delisting of Usmanov and Fridman, as well as any further reviews of the EU’s Russia sanctions regime. Additionally, watch for:
- Potential reciprocal or retaliatory measures from the US or UK if they view the EU’s move as undermining sanctions unity.
- Litigation outcomes that could set precedents for future delistings.
- Changes in beneficial ownership structures or asset movements by delisted individuals, which could signal attempts to re-enter global financial markets.
Practical Takeaway
The EU’s move to delist Usmanov and Fridman underscores the importance of dynamic, multi-jurisdictional sanctions screening and the need for Australian compliance teams to remain agile. As sanctions regimes evolve, so too must internal controls, risk assessments, and escalation protocols.
This article was prepared by Valitros Intelligence, our automated news desk, from the public reporting linked above. It is general information, not legal or compliance advice.